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Setting the Statute of Limitations in United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012)
Joan I. Oppenheimer, Reviewer
United States Department of Justice 
Tax Division1
A.  The statute – 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) – “If the taxpayer omits
from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in
excess of 25% of the amount of gross income stated in the return, the
tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such
tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after
the return was filed.”
 
Note the same language in 26 U.S.C. § 6229(c)(2), which pertains
to partnership returns:  “If any partnership omits from gross income
an amount properly includible therein which is excess of 25 percent of
the amount of gross income stated in its return,” the IRS has six years
to assess any income tax “with respect to any person which is
attributable to any partnership item (or affected item) for a partnership
taxable year” (§ 6229(a)).
B.  The issue – Whether an understatement of income resulting from
an overstatement of the tax basis of sold property can qualify as an
omission from gross income for purposes of the extended, six-year
assessment period of 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).
C.  The factual context – the highly-abusive Son-of-BOSS tax shelter,
which relied on a partner’s inflated  basis in his partnership (“outside
basis”) to reduce gains or create an artificial loss; occurred primarily in
1999-2000                   
1.   Description of Son-of-BOSS tax shelter – a partner contributes
encumbered property to the partnership, which expressly assumes the
associated obligation.  The partner increases his outside basis by the
value of the asset contributed to the partnership.  See 26 U.S.C. § 722. 
The partner, however, does not reduce his outside basis under 26
U.S.C. § 752(a) and (b) to reflect the partnership’s assumption of the
associated obligation.  That omission results in a vastly overstated
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basis, which either generates a large artificial tax loss or reduces the
gain that would otherwise result from the sale of an asset
2.  Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 put the Son-of-BOSS shelter
out of business; it informed taxpayers that the purported losses arising
from these transactions are not allowable for federal income tax
purposes and that penalties may be imposed on the participants.
3.  Home Concrete facts – the limited liability company, taxed as
a partnership, sold the assets of another business (which taxpayers
Pierce, Chandler, and their grantor trusts had transferred to it); on its
partnership return, the LLC accurately reported the sale proceeds, but
significantly reduced the capital gain from $6.3 million to $69,125
due to an artificially-inflated basis
a.   The artificially-inflated basis was attributable to a short
sale, which is a sale of a security that the investor does not own. 
Typically this is done by borrowing shares from a broker.  The short
seller is obligated, however, to buy an equivalent number of shares in
order to return the borrowed shares
b.  Four partners had sold T-Notes short and had
transferred the sale proceeds ($7,471,000) to Home Concrete, which
assumed the offsetting obligation to close the short sales; 
c.  These partners stepped up their outside bases to include
the short sale proceeds, but did not reduce their basis to reflect Home
Concrete’s assumption of the obligation to close the short sales on the
theory that the obligation to close a short sale is a contingent obligation
which is not taken into account for basis purposes.
 i.  Two appellate courts have recently rejected the
argument that the obligation to close a short sale is a contingent
obligation which is not taken into account for basis purposes.  Kornman
& Associates, Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008);
Marriott Internat’l Resorts v. United States, 586 F.3d 962 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
ii.  Under 26 C.F.R. § 1.752-1(a)(4)(ii), applicable to
liabilities incurred or assumed by a partnership on or after June 24,
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2003, an “obligation” is “any fixed or contingent obligation to make
payment without regard to whether the obligation is otherwise taken
into account for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code” and includes
an obligation under a short sale. 
   
d.  Shortly thereafter, these partners transferred part of
their partnership interests to another partner, which enabled Home
Concrete to make an election under 26 U.S.C. § 754 to adjust the basis
in its assets (“inside basis”) to equal the partners’ outside bases.  In so
doing, it received a basis bump of over $6 million.
e.  Home Concrete then sold substantially all its assets to a
TP for $10.6 million.
f.  IRS issued a notice of final partnership administrative
adjustment (“FPAA”) to Home Concrete
i.  Timing of – issued less than six years but more than
three years after the individual partners (and the partnership) had
filed their returns.  
ii.  Contents – the IRS reduced to zero the short-term
capital gain resulting from the T-Note transactions, reasoning that
Home Concrete was a sham and lacked economic substance and was
formed and used solely for tax avoidance purposes
4.  The understatement of income was hard to discover
i.  Neither the partnership return nor the partners’ returns
disclosed the transfer of the short sale proceeds and the offsetting
obligation to Home Concrete
ii.  Returns did not disclose the fact that the basis step-up
resulted from the partners’ asymmetric treatment of the short sale
proceeds and the offsetting obligations to close the short sales.
iii.  The examination of the returns of taxpayers (Pierce,
Chandler, their grantor trusts), Home Oil, and related entities, resulted
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from information that the IRS obtained as a result of issuing a John
Doe summons to Jenkens & Gilchrist, taxpayers’ tax consultants and a
now-defunct law firm.
D. Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) 
1. Statute in Colony – § 275(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, which contains the same language as 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) -
“omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein . . .”
2.  Facts – taxpayer understated business income from selling
residential lots by overstating the cost bases of these lots; base were
overstated by erroneously including in their cost certain unallowable
items of development expense 
3. US position
a. The 1939 Code defines “gross income” as including gains
from any source, and provides that gains are computed by subtracting
the property’s cost from the amount realized on the sale or other
disposition of the property.
b.  Overstated basis results in an omission from gross
income just as much as if the gross receipts are understated and should
be treated the same. 
4.  Taxpayer position – emphasized the word “omits”; argued that
the extended assessment period is limited to situations in which
specific receipts or accruals of income items are left out of the
computation of gross income
                    
5.  Sup. Ct. found the language “omits from gross income . . .” to
be ambiguous and resorted to legislative history to interpret it.
6.  Holding – the ambiguous language referred to the “specific
situation where a taxpayer actually omitted some income receipt or
accrual in his computation of gross income, and not more generally to
errors in that computation arising from other causes.”  357 U.S. at 33
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7.  Rationale – Congress, in enacting § 275(c) “manifested no
broader purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two years
to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer’s
omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special
disadvantage in detecting errors.”   357 U.S. at 36.
E.  Developments after Colony
1.  Adoption of the 1954 Code, which amended the extended
assessment period to include two subsections that were not in the 1939
Code (Richard Rice will discuss this)
2.  Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1968) – a
murky case involving basis overstatement
a.  Fifth Circuit identified the failure to disclose the basis
step-up as the critical error justifying application of the six-year
assessment period
b.  According to a subsequent Fifth Circuit case (Burks v.
United States, 633 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 2011)), Phinney involved not
only a misstated amount but also a misrepresentation of “the very
nature of the item reported such that the IRS could not have
reasonably known what was actually being reported, an almost direct
omission.” 
3.  35-50 Son-of-BOSS cases presenting the same issue as this
case – US loses in the Tax Court, where most cases are brought, and in
the Court of Federal Claims; US wins in two district courts – this case
and one other case (Burks v. United States)
a.  Home Concrete – District Court held that 1954
amendments to the Code rendered Colony inapplicable
b.  Dist. Ct. accepts Government’s position that when a
taxpayer overstates its basis in property, it omits gross income
c. Dist. Ct. rationale – definition of “gross income” as all
income from whatever source derived, including gains from dealings in
property (26 U.S.C. § 61(a)); definition of gains from the dealings in
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property as the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis
(26 U.S.C. § 1001(a))
4.  US loses first appellate cases involving this issue:  Bakersfield
Energy Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009);
Salman Ranch Ltd v. United States, 576 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
a.  US efforts to distinguish Colony on the basis of statutory
amendments in 1954 proved unsuccessful
b.  Bakersfield Energy – 9th Circuit characterized the US
position as both “reasonable” and “sensible” (568 F.3d at 775, 778) and
stated, “The IRS may have the authority to promulgate a reasonable
reinterpretation of an ambiguous provision of the tax code even if its
interpretation runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s opinion as to the
best reading of the provision” (id. at 778) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
F.  Case law background to development of regulations
1.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) – emphasized the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes; agencies, not
courts, fill statutory gaps
a. Two-step procedure for determining the validity of an
agency’s statutory construction
i.  Determine if statute is clear; if so, “the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”  
ii.  If “Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”
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467 U.S. at 842-843 (footnotes omitted).
b. “[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”  Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
c.  In Chevron the Court thus presumed “that Congress,
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” 
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-741 (1996)
d.  How do you determine whether a statute is ambiguous?
Do you rely on the statutory language alone?  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843 n.9 (“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”)
2.  National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967 (2005) (“Brand X”) 
a.  9th Circuit had declined to apply Chevron because it
thought the FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act was
foreclosed by the conflicting construction of the Act it had adopted in a
prior case.
b.  Supreme Court disagreed; “A court’s prior judicial
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that
its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”  Id. at 982.
3.  Mayo Found. for Medical Educ. and Research v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) - presented question of validity of an interpretive
Treasury regulation
a.  Rejects National Muffler Dealers’ multi-factor analysis,
which was previously used to determine the validity of Treasury
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regulations (National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S.
472 (1979))
b. “The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply
with full force in the tax context.”  131 S. Ct. at 713.
c.  Chevron’s two-step analysis provides the proper
framework for evaluating the validity of all Treasury regulations,
regardless whether Congress’s delegation of authority was general or
specific
i.  General delegation of authority - 26 U.S.C. §
7805(a))  – “[T]he Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title. . . .”
ii. Example of specific delegation of authority – 26
U.S.C. § 1503- “In any case in which a consolidated return is made or is
required to be made, the tax shall be determined, computed, assessed,
collected, and adjusted in accordance with the regulations under section
1502. . . .”
4.  Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) –
issuance of regulations in response to litigation is no impediment to
giving them Chevron deference
a.  The regulation in issue was proposed after the trial
court’s dismissal of the complaint and adopted after the California
Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal
b. Notwithstanding these undisputed facts and the
promulgation of the regulation over 100 years after the enactment of
the relevant statute, the Supreme Court gave Chevron deference to the
regulation.
5.   United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984)
a.  Regulations were issued after Court of Claims’ entry of
judgment against the Government.
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b.  Sup. Ct. gave regulations Chevron deference and
reversed the judgment on the basis of these regulations
c.  Court stated that the promulgation of the regulations
after commencement of the action was “of no consequence” to the
question whether they were entitled to deference.  Id. at 836 n.21.
d.  The Court explained (id.):
Congress authorized the issuance of regulations
so that problems arising in the administration of
the statute could be addressed.  Litigation often
brings to light latent ambiguities or unanswered
questions that might not otherwise be apparent. 
Thus, assuming the promulgation of § 581.305(f)
was a response to this suit, that demonstrates
only that the suit brought to light an additional
administrative problem of the type that Congress
thought should be addressed by regulation. 
When OPM responded to this problem by issuing
regulations it was doing no more than the task
which Congress had assigned it.
G.  The temporary regulations 
1.  Timing – issued on Sept. 24, 2009 (simultaneously with
proposed regulations) about ten months after the US had won Home
Concrete in the district court and prior to appellate briefing – T.D.
9466, 74 Fed. Reg. at 49321; 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii),
301.6229(c)(2)-1T(a)(1)(iii) 
2.  Contents – Regulations “clarify that, outside of the trade or
business context, gross income for purposes of sections 6501(e)(1)(A)
and 6229(c)(2) has the same meaning as gross income as defined in
section 61(a).”  T.D. 9466, 74 Fed. Reg. at 49321.  Since, in the case of
the sale of property, “gross income” under § 61 means the excess of the
amount realized over the adjusted basis of the property, under the
temporary regulations, “any basis overstatement that leads to an
understatement of gross income under section 61(a) constitutes an
10
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omission from gross income for purposes of sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and
6229(c)(2).”  Id.
3.  Application – “to taxable years with respect to which the
applicable period for assessing tax did not expire before September 24,
2009.”  Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T(b), 301.6501(e)-1T(b).   
4.   Statutory authority  – 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e) 
a.  Authorizes temporary regulations
b.  Provides that any temporary regulation shall also be
issued as a proposed regulation
c.  Provides that any temporary regulation shall expire
within 3 years from the date of issuance.
d.  Implication – notice and comment not necessary to their
validity
5.   “Interpretive”regulations (e.g., rules promulgated pursuant to
Treasury’s general rule-making authority, I.R.C. § 7805(a)), are exempt
from notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)
6.  US position – temporary regulations are entitled to Chevron
deference
a.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) –
presented question of the deference to be accorded certain tariff
classification rulings
i.  Sup. Ct., refining its Chevron analysis, determined
that Chevron deference was available to any administrative
implementation of a statutory provision “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law,” and “the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”  Id. at 226-227. 
11
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ii.  This reference to regulations having the “force of
law” is not confined to legislative regulations, but applies equally to
regulations issued pursuant to an agency’s “generally conferred
authority” to interpret and enforce the law.  Id. at 229
b. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)
i. Chevron deference given to an agency’s regulatory
interpretation that was “reached . . . through means less formal than
‘notice and comment’ rulemaking. . . .”  Id. at 221.  
ii.  Factors upon which Sup. Ct. based its
determination that Chevron deference was appropriate – “the
interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time.”  Id. at 222.
c.  Several circuit courts have given temporary Treasury
regulations Chevron deference.  See Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d
533, 537-38 (4th Cir. 1999); McDonnell v. United States, 180 F.3d 721,
722-23 (6th Cir. 1999); Miller v. United States, 65 F.3d 687, 689-90 (8th
Cir. 1995). 
H.  The final regulations
1.  Published Dec. 17, 2010, after notice and comment, and after
the case was fully briefed and argued in the Fourth Circuit – T.D. 9511,
75 Fed. Reg. 78897 (Dec. 17, 2010) – largely identical to the temporary
regulations
2.  Issuance after notice and comment rendered moot any
arguments that the regulations should receive less deference because
they were temporary and promulgated without notice and comment
3.  US position – the final regulations cleared up any doubt as to
whether they applied to this and similar cases.
a.  Regulations state they “apply to taxable years with
respect to which the period for assessing tax was open on or after
12
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September 24, 2009.”  Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(c)(2)-1(b);
§ 301.6501(e)-1(e).  
b.  Preamble to the regulations explained, “The three-year
limitations period is one of several limitations periods in the Internal
Revenue Code, including the six-year limitations period under sections
6229(c)(2) and 6501(e)(1),” and “[t]he expiration of the three-year period
does not ‘close’ a taxable year if a longer period applies.”
I.  Conclusion 
1.  Home Concrete in the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court
was largely a conflict between Colony, on which Home Concrete relied,
and the regulations, on which the Government primarily relied.
2.  Although there have been and will be other cases involving a
conflict between regulatory and judicial interpretations of a statute, the
circumstances here were unique
a.  In Colony, the prior judicial interpretation was by the 
Supreme Court and pre-dated Chevron 
b.  Thus, the courts had to decide whether Colony should be
construed as a Chevron step one case or a Chevron step two case when
the Supreme Court in Colony described the relevant statute as
ambiguous and then resorted to legislative history to determine its
meaning.  If Colony was a Chevron step one case, the statute, as
construed by the Court, was clear, and regulation was foreclosed.  On
the other had, if Chevron was a Chevron step two case, the only
relevant question under Chevron was whether the regulation was
reasonable.
c.  The Home Concrete majority ultimately construed the
case as a Chevron step one case:
   “As the Government points out, the Court in Colony
stated that the statutory language at issue is not ‘unambiguous.’  357
U.S., at 33. . . .  But the Court decided that case nearly 30 years before
it decided Chevron.  There is no reason to believe that the linguistic
ambiguity noted by Colony reflects a post-Chevron conclusion that
13
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Congress had delegated gap-filling power to the agency.  At the same
time, there is every reason to believe that the Court thought that
Congress had ‘directly spoken to the question at hand,’ and thus left
‘[no] gap for the agency to fill.’”  132 S. Ct. at 1844, quoting Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-843.  Thus, the judicial interpretation in Colony
controlled, and regulation was foreclosed.
3.  Because of the unique circumstances present here, the
invalidation of the regulation by a narrow 5-4 majority is not likely, in
my view, to have much effect on the adoption of future regulations or
on the judicial evaluation of these regulations.
